ÎCCJ, decizie (scj.ro #86315)
ÎCCJ, decizie (scj.ro #86315) (Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție)
COUR EUROPÉENE
DES
DROITS DE
L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF
BULFINSKY
v.
ROMANIA
(Application no.
28823/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
1 June
2010
FINAL
01/09/2010
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of
Bulfinsky v.
Romania
,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Egbert Myjer,
Ineta Ziemele,
Ann Power,
judges,
and Santiago
Quesada
,
Section Registrar
,
Having deliberated in private on
11 May 2010
,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
28823/04) against
Romania
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr Cristian-R
ă
zvan
Bulfinsky (“the applicant”), on
2 July 2004
.
The applicant was represented by Mr Vasile Topârceanu,
a lawyer practising in
Bucharest
. The Romanian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Răzvan-Horațiu
Radu, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On 11 December 2008 the President of the Third
Section decided to communicate to the respondent Government the applicant's complaint
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him
had been unfair because of police entrapment. It was also decided to examine
the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29
).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in
Bucharest
.
At the beginning of April 2002 the police division
responsible for fighting organised crime and drug trafficking (“the police”)
received information that the applicant and his friends P.T. and D.C. were
trafficking in drugs. The three friends were ecstasy users. At the time of the
events, the applicant and D.C. were students.
On
18 April 2002
the police sought
authorisation from the prosecutor's office to use undercover agents and a
collaborator to follow the lead regarding the suspects' alleged criminal
activities. On the same day the organised crime and drug-trafficking section of
the prosecutor's office at the Supreme Court of Justice (“the prosecutor's
office”) authorised two agents, referred to in the proceedings as “Toni” and
“Sven” (the latter being introduced to the applicant and his friends as
“Alex”), and a collaborator, “Gotti”, to participate in the operation.
A. The uncontested events on
29 April 2002
On
29 April 2002
Sven met the applicant,
D.C. and P.T. in a restaurant (“restaurant E”) and agreed to meet with them
again later the same day.
At
9.15 p.m.
the applicant and
P.T. were sitting with Alex on the terrace of restaurant M and D.C. was sitting
at the adjacent table with some friends, when plain clothes police officers
rose from the neighbouring tables and arrested the three suspects. A yellow
plastic bag was taken from under the applicant's table and its contents checked;
the police noted that it contained bread, under which were several packets fastened
with brown tape which together contained 2,016 white tablets which later proved
to be ecstasy.
The three suspects were arrested on suspicion of
drug trafficking. The police took photographs and videotaped the events. Images
from the operation were shown on the evening news.
B. The statements of the applicant, D.C. and P.T. during
the proceedings
On her arrest D.C. confessed to the prosecutor
that she and P.T. had taken part in drug trafficking. However, she withdrew her
confessions before the first‑instance court, claiming that she had been
coerced into making them by the police with the promise that if she wrote down
what she was told to write, she would be released after ten minutes.
The applicant and his friends claimed that they
had been contacted by Gotti, whose real name was
Bogdan
, and who
was a friend of D.C. They gave the authorities his full name and address for
further investigation. Gotti had told them that Alex had various objects
(clothes and watches) for sale at reasonable prices. They finally agreed to meet
Alex and at
4.30 p.m.
on 29 April they, together with
Bogdan
, went to
restaurant E. They sat down with Alex, who did not have the merchandise with
him. Later that day the three friends were at bar N. when
Bogdan
told them
that Alex was at restaurant M and could meet them again. The applicant and
Bogdan
left in
Bogdan's car. After a while, they called D.C. and P.T., who had stayed behind,
and told them that
Bogdan
had forgotten a yellow plastic bag under
their table at the bar and asked them if they could bring it to restaurant M as
it contained food for Bogdan's wife, who was ill.
At
9.15 p.m.
the applicant and
Bogdan
arrived at
restaurant M and sat at Alex's table. Ten minutes later P.T., who was carrying
Bogdan's plastic bag, and D.C., joined them. P.T. sat at Alex's table while
D.C. sat at the next table with some acquaintances.
When Alex went to the toilet, plainclothes police
officers intervened, expecting to find exactly 2,000 tablets of ecstasy in the
bag under the table.
In their statements, the applicant and his
friends insisted that the drugs had in fact been given to the undercover agents
by the police for the purpose of the covert operation. In support of their statements
they pointed out that despite their constant surveillance over the previous few
days the police could not explain where the friends had obtained the drugs.
C. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
The indictment
The applicant and his friends were arrested and taken
into custody on the evening of
29 April 2002
, on suspicion of
trafficking in drugs. Their detention was maintained by the courts throughout
the proceedings.
The prosecutor's office heard evidence from the
applicant, D.C. and P.T., and from two eyewitnesses who had been present on the
terrace at restaurant M, and examined the written records of statements by Toni
and Sven. At the prosecutor's request, both the applicant's and D.C.'s flats
were searched by the police. No drugs or other illegal substances were found.
The prosecutor concluded that on
29 April
2002
Gotti had informed Toni that the three persons were preparing a
transaction involving MDMA tablets (
methylenedioxymethamphetamine
). Toni had
then contacted Sven, who had met with the suspects to secure the transaction.
According to Sven's statements, the suspects had offered to sell him 4,000
tablets of MDMA for 4 US dollars each.
On
21 June 2002
the prosecutor's
office committed the applicant, P.T. and D.C. for trial on charges of drug-trafficking,
in violation of Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug
trafficking and illegal drug use (“Law no. 143”).
It also decided to sever the criminal
investigations from those concerning another participant in the trafficking,
Bogdan
, who had
not yet been identified by the police. On
13 February
2003
, the prosecutor's office at the Supreme Court of Justice
identified
Bogdan
as being the same person as Gotti and closed
the investigation against him.
Proceedings before the first-instance court
Several hearings were held before the Bucharest
County Court.
The three accused denied their involvement in
drug trafficking and claimed that they had been entrapped by the police. They repeatedly
stated that
Bogdan
had also been present at restaurant M.
The defence lawyers insisted on the importance for
the court of hearing evidence from
Bogdan
in the presence of
the defendants. They also requested the police to produce the bag and the packets
in which the tablets had been found and to collect fingerprints from them. They
considered that the court should see the video tapes of the events. Lastly,
they asked for a confrontation between the applicants, which would allow them
to prove that the police had put pressure on them and made them promises in
order to obtain the initial declarations.
The court did not hear that evidence.
The County Court gave judgment on
15 April 2003
. It found
the three accused guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced them each to four
years' imprisonment. It deducted from the sentence the time spent in pre‑trial
detention. The court also confiscated the 1,965 tablets of MDMA that were left
after laboratory tests had been carried out.
The County Court dismissed the defence arguments
on the ground that under Law no. 143 statements made by undercover agents and
their collaborators can constitute evidence. The court was satisfied that those
statements had not been obtained illegally and considered that the defence
argument to the contrary could not taint the evidence. It also considered that
the intention of the accused to sell drugs was evidenced by their entering into
negotiations with Toni and Gotti, which in turn led to their authorising Sven
to make the transaction with the defendants and obtain the drugs from them.
In reaching its conclusion, the County Court relied on the
statements made by the suspects and the undercover agents Toni and Sven to the
police, as well as the declarations made by the applicant before the court. It
gave precedence to the statement given by D.C. during the investigations as it
considered that her withdrawal of her initial statement to the police was
unjustified, as she had not proved that she had been coerced into making it.
The
appeal proceedings
All the parties appealed against the judgment of
15 April 2003
. The
defence counsel reiterated that the evidence gathered against the defendants
was illegal, that the drugs had belonged to the police and that
Bogdan
should be
heard by the court.
In a decision of
29 October
2003
the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld the County Court's
findings on the facts of the case and its examination of the participants'
guilt. It considered, however, that the County Court had erred in determining the
sentence, in that it had not taken into account the seriousness of the crimes
committed and the fact that, as students, the participants had a higher level of
education which should have allowed them to comprehend the gravity of their
deeds. It therefore increased the sentence to twelve years' imprisonment for
each defendant.
In a final decision of
20 April 2004
the High
Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the defendants' appeals in cassation
and upheld the Court of Appeal's decision.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and of Law no. 143 are set out in
Constantin and Stoian
v. Romania
,
nos. 23782/06
and 46629/06
,
§§ 33-34, 29 September 2009.
The Council of Europe's
texts on the use of special investigative techniques are detailed in
Ramanauskas
v. Lithuania
[GC], no. 74420/01, §§ 35-37, ECHR 2008‑....
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that he had not received
a fair trial in the criminal proceedings against him, alleging a violation of
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, which read as follows:
“1. In
the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing... Judgment shall be pronounced publicly...
Everyone
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(d) to
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;”
In particular, he claimed that he and his friends
had been entrapped by the undercover agents and their collaborator and that the
drugs found at the scene had belonged to the police. He also complained that
there was no lawful evidence of their involvement in drug trafficking and that
the courts had failed to examine essential evidence; in particular, they had
failed to ask for fingerprints to be taken from the bag containing the drugs, to
take
a statement from the key witness
Bogdan
, and to hear the
transcription of the telephone conversations that had taken place between the
co-defendants and the undercover agents. In addition, he considered that the
prosecutor and the courts had not correctly established the legal classification
of the crime allegedly committed.
Under the same Article, the applicant complained that the
decisions had not been pronounced publicly.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The parties' submissions
a) The
Government
The Government supported the prosecutor's version
of the facts, as confirmed by the domestic courts.
They submitted a detailed description of the
procedure on covert police operations in
Romania
and pointed
out that a system permitting such operations was common to many European
countries and was recommended by the Council of Europe and the European Union
in certain instances.
Regarding the facts of the present case, they
denied that there had been police entrapment, and considered that the evidence
in the file supported their submission.
They also rejected the allegations of unfairness
in the proceedings. In their view, the courts had given a detailed
interpretation of the evidence and had explained their conclusions thoroughly.
Moreover, unlike in the case of
Teixeira de
Castro v. Portugal
(9 June 1998,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998-IV), the courts in the case at hand had not based their decision solely on
the undercover agents' testimonies, but also on the defendants' statements
given at various stages of the proceedings.
Lastly, quoting
Klaas v. Germany
(22
September 1993, § 29,
Series A no. 269),
the Government pointed out that it is not normally within
the province of the European Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts
for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for these courts
to assess the evidence before them.
b) The
applicant
The applicant submitted that there was no
convincing evidence in the file that he had taken part in drug trafficking, and
he reiterated that no drugs had been found on him at the time of his arrest.
He argued that he had not participated in an
operation involving the sale of drugs, in so far as the drugs had passed from
one police agent's hands to the other without any intention of them being sold.
In his opinion, it was merely a police operation aimed at gathering evidence. He
reiterated that the courts had not heard the video or audio recordings of the
operation; that no fingerprints had been taken from the bag containing the
drugs; and that there had been no confrontation between the defendants and the
undercover agents and their collaborator, who had never even been heard by the
prosecutor or the courts.
The Court's assessment
The Court reiterates its recent case-law on
Article 6, in which it drew a detailed distinction between the concept of
entrapment and the use of legitimate undercover techniques and reaffirmed the
domestic courts' obligation to carry out a careful examination of the material
in the file where an accused invokes police entrapment. In this context, the
Court has also established that its function under Article 6 § 1 is
not to determine whether certain items of evidence were obtained unlawfully,
but rather to examine whether such “unlawfulness” resulted in the infringement
of another right protected by the Convention; it thus has to review the quality
of the domestic courts' assessment of the alleged entrapment and to ensure that
they adequately secured the accused's rights of defence, in particular the
right to adversarial proceedings and to equality of arms (see
Ramanauskas
,
cited above, §§ 49-61;
Malininas v. Lithuania
, no. 10071/04,
§§ 34-35, 1 July 2008; and
Bykov v. Russia
[GC], no. 4378/02,
§§ 88-93, 10 March 2009).
To ascertain whether or not the undercover police
confined themselves to “investigating criminal activity in an essentially
passive manner” in the present case (see
Ramanauskas
, cited above, §
55), the Court has regard to a number of considerations. There are no
indications that the applicant or the co-defendants have been previously
involved in drug‑related crimes. The Court notes that the authorities did
not give details or refer to any objective evidence concerning unlawful
behaviour by the suspects prior to the incidents of
29 April
2002
. Moreover, no drugs were found either in the applicant's
possession or in his home (see paragraph 16 above).
The Court also notes that the parties gave
different interpretations of the events that occurred on
29 April 2002
. According
to the authorities, the applicant and his co-defendants had agreed to broker
the deal. However, the applicant, claiming police entrapment, stated that he
had not been aware of the content of the bag, which, in fact, belonged to the
police collaborator
Bogdan
; he also maintained that the drugs in the bag
had belonged to the police.
In the light of these divergent interpretations, it
is essential that the Court examine the procedure whereby the plea of
incitement was determined in order to ensure that the rights of the defence
were adequately protected, in particular the right to adversarial proceedings and
to equality of arms (see
Ramanauskas
, §§ 60-61, and
Malininas
,
, both cited above and
Khudobin v. Russia
, no. 59696/00, § 133,
ECHR 2006‑XII (extracts)
).
In convicting the applicant and his co-defendants,
the courts relied exclusively on the evidence obtained during the
investigations, namely written reports by the undercover agents and the
statements made by the suspects, as well as the defendants' testimonies before
the first-instance court.
The courts did not reply to the defence's requests for evidence,
in particular in relation to Bogdan's involvement and role, or to their
requests for fingerprints to be collected from the bags containing the drugs or
for the recording of the events to be heard by the courts. Furthermore, the
courts did not hear the undercover agents. The defence thus had no opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses. The courts also decided to give precedence to the
statements obtained by the investigators and considered that those given before
the first-instance court had been false.
In the light of the defendants allegations as to
the police involvement, the domestic courts could not have ensured the respect
of the principle of fairness, and in particular the equality of arms, without
hearing evidence from
Bogdan
and the undercover
police officers and without allowing the defendants to question, even in
writing, those persons. Furthermore, the court should have examined or at least
given more thorough explanations to why it rejected the other requests for
evidence.
The Court cannot hold in the abstract that
evidence given by a witness in open court and on oath should always be relied
on in preference to other statements made by the same witness in the course of
criminal proceedings, even when the two are in conflict (see
Doorson v.
the Netherlands
, 26 March 1996,
,
Reports of
Judgments and Decisions
1996‑II
). However, the Court considers
that the reasoning given by the County Court to justify the precedence given to
D.C.'s statements to the investigators might raise an issue as to the respect
of the rights of the defence.
Lastly, the Court notes the summary manner in
which the domestic courts rejected the allegations of police entrapment. It
notes that the common ground of the divergent interpretations given by the
parties of the facts of the case is that the applicant and his friends
negotiated with Gotti/
Bogdan
and then met with
Sven.
In conclusion, while mindful of the importance
and the difficulties of the task of the investigating agents, the Court
considers, having regard to the foregoing, that the domestic courts did not
investigate sufficiently the allegations of entrapment. For these reasons the
applicant's trial was deprived of the fairness required by Article 6 of the
Convention.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention on this account.
Furthermore, the Court considers that the foregoing
conclusion makes examination of the remainder of the complaint redundant.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant considered that, in the
circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed on him constituted a violation
of Article 3 of the Convention.
He also raised several complaints, under Article
5, about his arrest and pre-trial detention, in particular concerning the imposition
of that preventive measure and its repeated extension by the courts.
The applicant complained that his sentence had
been increased by the Court of Appeal solely because he was a student, which in
his view constituted discrimination under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention taken
together with Article 14.
Under Article 7 of the Convention, the applicant
complained that he had been convicted of a crime that had never existed, in so far
as he had been entrapped.
The Court considers that the issues raised by the
applicant under Articles 3, 7 and 14 are simply a reiteration of those already
raised and examined under Article 6.
In addition, the Court notes that while a person may be
humiliated by the mere fact of being criminally convicted, what is relevant for
the purposes of Article 3 is that he should be humiliated not simply by his
conviction but by the execution of the punishment (see
Tyrer v.
the United Kingdom
, 25 April 1978, § 30, Series A no. 26)
. Nothing
in the case indicates such humiliation, and the applicant has failed to
substantiate his claims to the contrary. Lastly, the Court notes that the crime
of which the applicant was convicted is prohibited by Law no. 143. The Article
7 complaint is thus unsubstantiated.
Therefore, in the light of all the material in
its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its
Protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
As to the complaints raised under Article 5, the
Court notes that the applicant's pre-trial detention ended with the adoption of
the judgment of 15 April 2003, that is, more than six months before the
lodging of this application on 2 July 2004 (see
Mujea v. Romania
(dec.),
no. 44696/98, 10 September 2002, and
Negoescu v. Romania
(dec.), no. 55450/00, 17 March 2005).
It follows that this complaint has been
introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If
the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 109,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of pecuniary damage, broken down as follows:
– EUR 4,000 represents the salary he would have earned
from 2002 to 2004 if he had continued in the employment he had at the date of
his arrest;
– EUR 105,000 represents the salary he would have earned
from 2004, when he was due to graduate from University, to date.
He also claimed EUR 105,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government argued that the applicant had not
justified his claims and that there was no causal link with his conviction.
They also considered that the finding of a violation constituted
in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage alleged by
the applicant.
Lastly, the Government pointed out that, if the Court found that
the criminal proceedings had not been fair, the Code of Criminal Procedure provided
for the reopening of the proceedings before the domestic courts.
The Court acknowledges that the applicant has the
option of seeking the reopening of the proceedings under domestic law.
As to the damages sought by the applicant, the Court does not
discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage
alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the
applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant made no claim under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.
Declares
the complaint concerning Article 6
of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2.
Holds
that there has been a violation of
the principle of fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3.
Holds
that there is no need to examine the remainder
of the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention;
4.
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten
thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the respondent State's national
currency at the rate applicable on the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during
the default period plus three percentage points;
5.
Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant's
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on
1 June 2010
, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep
Casadevall
Registrar President