ÎCCJ, decizie (scj.ro #86340)
ÎCCJ, decizie (scj.ro #86340) (Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție)
COUR EUROPÉENE
DES
DROITS DE
L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF
CONSTANTIN AND
STOIAN v.
ROMANIA
(Applications nos.
23782/06 and 46629/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29
September 2009
FINAL
29/12/2009
This judgment may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of
Constantin and Stoian v.
Romania
,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Egbert Myjer,
Ineta Ziemele,
Luis López Guerra,
Ann Power,
judges,
and Stanley Naismith
,
Deputy
Section
Registrar
,
Having deliberated in private on
8
September 2009
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in two applications (nos.
23782/06 and 46629/06) against
Romania
lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Romanian nationals, Mr
Marius-Georgian Constantin and Mr Florin Stoian (“the applicants”), on
1 June 2006
and
9 November 2006
respectively.
They were represented by Mr Niculae Constantin (the
first applicant) and Mr Nicolae Trăistaru (the second applicant),
lawyers practising in
Bucharest
. The Romanian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Răzvan-Horațiu
Radu, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On
12 February 2008
the President of the
Third Section decided
to communicate the complaints concerning the allegations of lack of a
fair trial (Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention) and the use of
agents
provocateurs
to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits
of the applications at the same time as their admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicants were born in 1979 and 1971
respectively. The first applicant lives in
Bucharest
, and the
second in Afumați, Ilfov county.
On
11 November 2003
the prosecutor
started criminal proceedings against “George” and “
Florin
”, later
identified as the applicants, based on information that they were trafficking
in drugs. No other details were given in this decision of the prosecutor.
A. The events of
18
November 2003
On
18 November 2003
the police division
responsible for the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking (“the
police”) sought authorisation from the prosecutor’s office to use an undercover
agent and to obtain two grammes of heroin in order to gather evidence of the applicants’
alleged involvement in drug trafficking. It relied on Law no. 143/2000 on
the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (“Law no. 143”). The
same day, the organised crime and drug trafficking section of the prosecutor’s office
at the Bucharest Court of Appeal (“the prosecutor’s office”) authorised the
operation for ten days and handed over the two grammes of heroin to the
undercover agent (referred to in the domestic proceedings as “Alex 1”).
The police set up the surveillance operation in
the car park of McDonald’s Dristor (
Bucharest
), where the
trafficking was thought to happen. Meanwhile G.M., a police collaborator
(referred to in the domestic proceedings as “Alex 2”), set up a meeting with the
first applicant, whom he had known previously.
At 13.45 Alex 1 arrived by car in the parking area
together with Alex 2. The first applicant and another man were sitting in
another car. Alex 2 got out and approached the applicant; he was to tell
him that Alex 1, whom the applicant did not know, wanted to contact a person
who could sell him two grammes of heroin. After a short talk, Alex 2 returned
accompanied by the first applicant; the latter then left by car with Alex 1.
The police followed the car until it stopped in front of a building on
Zizin Street
. The
applicant made a phone call from Alex 1’s mobile phone. He left the car and
entered the building, where he remained for 10-15 minutes. He then returned
with the second applicant to Alex 1’s car. The first applicant took the right
front seat, while the second applicant remained standing near the right front
door of the car. Alex 1 handed money to the first applicant; the latter passed it
to the second applicant who took it and walked away.
At that moment the police got out of their cars
and shouted: “Police, stop!”. The second applicant started running, abandoning
his jacket and the money. He managed to escape into one of the neighbouring buildings.
The first applicant was identified and searched.
Sixteen tablets of methadone were found on him. He admitted that the tablets
belonged to him and declared that he was a rehabilitated drug user and was
authorised to take methadone. A small package containing 1.5 g of heroin was visible
in the car near the gear lever. The police seized it.
The same day a search was conducted in the flat from
where the second applicant had come, and where he lived with S.F., his partner.
No drugs were found.
The first applicant was taken into custody for 24
hours, but released on
19 November 2003
. While in custody, he
was taken to hospital under suspicion that he had swallowed a package of
heroin. The treatment did not confirm the suspicions.
The second applicant was apprehended on
18 May 2004
after
being noticed on the street by Alex 1. He was taken into police custody. On
20 May 2004
the
Bucharest
County Court
ordered his pre-trial detention for thirty days. His detention
was subsequently extended by the court every thirty days until the end of the
proceedings before the first-instance court.
B. Applicants’ statements during the criminal
investigations
On
18
November 2003
the first applicant made a statement to the police, in the
presence of a lawyer. He admitted to having facilitated the drugs sale between
Alex 1 and the second applicant. He stated that he had taken the money from
Alex 1 and handed it to the second applicant, who had then put a small bag of
heroin near the gear lever. He also stated that he had obtained the methadone
tablets from a nurse in
Badgasar
Hospital
in
exchange for a bag of coffee.
The prosecution file contains a second statement
in the same terms, which is not dated and is signed only by the first applicant.
He claimed it had been taken the same day, on his arrest.
The next day, however, the first applicant, in
the presence of his lawyer, changed his position and stated before the
Bucharest County Court that he was not a drug dealer and had not taken drugs
for two years. He also stated that G.M. had requested him to make the second
applicant come out of his house, where the police would be present. He had only
agreed to help because he understood that it was a covert police operation. He
maintained that an exchange of money for a small bag had occurred between Alex
1 and the second applicant. He also confirmed that the sixteen tablets of
methadone were for his own use and that he had obtained them without
prescription.
When interviewed by the prosecutor on 5 and
7 July 2004
the first
applicant took the same position as before the County Court. He explained that
he had given the statement of
18 November 2003
thinking that he
would be participating in the criminal proceedings only as a witness and not as
an accused.
On 19 May 2004 the second applicant told the prosecutor
that he had not handed anything to the first applicant, that he had not known
what the small package found in the car contained and that he had only agreed
to accompany the first applicant to the car because the latter had told the
second applicant that he had money for the second applicant’s partner, S.F. He
also declared that at that moment he had not known that S.F. was a drug dealer.
On
1 March 2004
S.F. was also arrested for drug trafficking
in the context of a separate investigation.
The second applicant maintained his above statements
on
20 May 2004
before the Bucharest County Court and on
7 July 2004
in an
interview with the prosecutor.
On
12 July 2004
the prosecutor’s office
indicted the applicants for possession and sale of dangerous drugs in violation
of Law no. 143. It established, based on the evidence gathered, that the second
applicant had given the small bag of heroin to the first applicant, who had handed
it to Alex 1, and that in exchange Alex 1 had given him the money, which he had
then handed to the second applicant.
The prosecutor noted that the first applicant had
been found guilty of possession and consumption of drugs in 2001 and that the
second applicant had no known criminal record.
C. Proceedings before the
Bucharest County
Court
The applicants gave statements on
7 September 2004
. The
first applicant reiterated that he had only agreed to contact the second
applicant because he had been informed of the covert police operation. The
second applicant maintained his position and denied trafficking in drugs.
The undercover agent and the collaborator supported
the prosecutor’s version of the facts and maintained that the first applicant
had not been aware of the police operation.
Some of the witnesses who had been unfavourable
to the applicants during the investigations changed their statements before the
court and claimed that they had signed without reading statements drafted
entirely by the police.
At the hearing on
20 May
2005
, after several reminders left unanswered by the prosecutor’s office,
the applicants’ lawyers no longer insisted on obtaining an answer concerning the
fate of the bag of heroin released to Alex 1 for the covert operation.
On
25 May 2005
the
Bucharest
County Court
gave judgment, acquitting the applicants. It considered that
the elements in the file indicated that on
18 November
2003
the police had sought to provoke a drug sale and had failed. Consequently,
the heroin received by Alex 1 from the prosecutor’s office had been placed in
the car to prove the alleged commission of the criminal offence. The court also
noted that the criminal proceedings had been started illegally on
11 November as at that date there had been no relevant information on the
applicants’ alleged criminal behaviour, and the facts under investigation had only
taken place on 18 November. It also noted that the exchange of money for
drugs was not proved, and that the witnesses could not support the prosecution’s
version. The court ordered the second applicant’s immediate release.
D. Appeal proceedings
On
3 October 2005
the appeal
proceedings started before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, on an application
lodged by the prosecutor’s office. The Court of Appeal heard evidence from the
prosecutor and the applicants’ lawyers. The applicants used their right to
address the court before the end of the hearing (
ultimul cuvânt al
inculpatului
). No other evidence was requested by the parties or heard by
the court.
On
10 October
2005
the Court of Appeal convicted and sentenced the first applicant
to seven year’s imprisonment and the second applicant to six years’
imprisonment. It considered that the detailed description of the events made by
the undercover agent and the collaborator should have been given more weight as
they corroborated the police reports on the arrest in
flagrante delicto
and thus reflected the truth. The court decided that the first applicant had not
been honest in his statements and that he had only claimed to have been aware
of the covert police action because he knew from his own experience that
collaborators were protected by law. It also concluded that the second applicant’s
aim had been to protract the investigations. The court took the fact that the
witnesses changed their position as proof of their dishonesty.
The Court of Appeal set aside the County Court’s finding of incitement
as follows:
“The
court considers, unlike the first-instance court, that Article 68 §§ 1 and 2 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable so long as the evidence does not
show that Constantin Marius Georgian was threatened or coerced to commit the
facts. Likewise it is not proved that he was persuaded by the police to commit a
crime, ... he agreed to facilitate the drug sale, but no longer admitted to it before
the court.”
It considered the arguments based on the origin of the heroin
found as follows:
“...
Constantin Marius Georgian himself stated when apprehended by the police and in
subsequent statements that the drugs found in the car had been handed over by
Stoian Florin, in exchange for 6,000,000 lei.”
The first applicant was also convicted of illegal
possession of sixteen tablets of methadone.
The court deducted the second applicant’s
preventive detention from “
19 May 2004
to
25 May 2004
”. It also confiscated,
under Article 17 § 1 of Law no. 143/2000, the eight tablets of methadone and
1.48 g of heroin left after the laboratory tests from the first and the second
applicant respectively.
On
11 May 2006
the High Court of
Cassation and Justice upheld the conviction following an appeal on points of
law lodged by the applicants.
It also corrected the material error in the appeal decision
concerning the second applicant’s preventive detention, and in an interlocutory
judgment of
14 July 2006
noted that he had been detained from
19 May 2004
to
25 May 2005
.
E. Other proceedings
On
7 July 2004
and on 2 June and
16 August 2006
the applicants
lodged criminal complaints against G.C., the prosecutors in charge of their
investigation, the undercover agent and the witnesses alleging that they had
given false testimony to the investigative authorities. In addition, the
first applicant, in the appeal of
7 July
2004
, complained that several items adduced by him as evidence had
disappeared from the criminal file. On
11 October
2004
and 23 May and
13 June
2007
the prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and
Justice decided not to prosecute G.C. and Alex 1. On
25 February 2008
a similar
decision was taken in respect of the witnesses by the prosecutor’s office at the
Bucharest District Court.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 68 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
reads as follows:
Article
68
“1. It
is forbidden to use violence, threats or other means of coercion, as well as
inducements, in order to obtain evidence.
It
is also forbidden to incite a person to commit or continue committing a
criminal offence for the purpose of obtaining evidence.”
The relevant provisions of Law no. 143 read as
follows:
Article
1
“In
the present Act the terms and expressions below shall have the following
meaning:
...
(k) Undercover
agents: police officers specifically designated to carry out, with the
prosecutor’s authorisation, investigations with a view to collecting data
regarding the existence of the offence and the identification of the offender
and precursory acts, under another identity than their real one. Such
authorisation shall be conferred for a limited time only.”
Article
21
“1. The
prosecutor may authorise the use of undercover agents to determine the facts,
identify the offender and obtain evidence where there is good reason to believe
that a criminal offence as defined in the present Act has been perpetrated or
is about to be committed.”
Article
22
“1. Police
officers from the special units who act as undercover agents, as well as
persons acting with them, shall be allowed to procure drugs, base and compound
chemical substances with the prosecutor’s prior authorisation, with a view to
discovering criminal activities and identifying the persons involved in such
activities.
The
results of the actions of the police officers and persons acting with them
referred to in paragraph 1 may constitute evidence.”
The Council of Europe’s texts on the use of
special investigative techniques are detailed in
Ramanauskas v. Lithuania
[GC], no. 74420/01, §§ 35-37, ECHR 2008‑....
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
In view of the similarity of the cases in terms
of both fact and law, the Court finds it appropriate to join and examine them
together.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicants complained that they had not
received a fair trial in the criminal proceedings against them, alleging a
violation of Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (a), (b) and (c) of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“1. In
the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
Everyone
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.
Everyone
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to
be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require;”
In particular, the applicants complained that
they had been incited to commit a criminal offence by the undercover police
agent and his collaborator acting as
agents provocateurs
.
They considered that the prosecutor had not
observed the procedural requirements in issuing the indictment; that the
prosecution had been based on evidence gathered by pressuring witnesses into giving
false testimony; that the first applicant had not been assisted by a lawyer
when he had given his first statement and when the prosecutor had informed him
of the accusations on 18 November 2003 and had not been properly summoned
during the investigations; and that the second applicant had not been informed
of the prosecution acts between 18 November 2003 and 19 May 2004.
They also complained about the way the Court of Appeal
had changed the interpretation of the facts without hearing evidence and
without clarifying where the money given by Alex 1 had come from or what had
happened to the money and the two grammes of heroin released by the prosecutor
to the undercover police officer. The second applicant also pointed out that
the Court of Appeal had not ordered the examination of the bag of heroin for
fingerprints in order to establish whether he had touched that bag.
In addition, the first applicant complained that
he had been authorised to have the methadone as a rehabilitated drug user, and
had thus been convicted of a crime he had not committed.
Lastly, the applicants complained that the way
the Court of Appeal had interpreted the evidence had infringed their right to the
presumption of innocence.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this part of the application
is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The parties’ submissions
(a) The
Government
The Government averred that a system allowing for
covert police operations was common to other European countries and was
recommended by the Council of Europe and the European Union in certain
instances.
Regarding the facts of the present case, they
denied that there had been police incitement, arguing that the information
prior to the covert operation had revealed that the first applicant had been
predisposed to commit a criminal offence (they referred to
Sequeira v. Portugal
(dec.), no. 73557/01, ECHR 2003‑VI
). They
pointed out that the second applicant had had no direct contact with the
undercover agent.
The Government admitted that the first applicant seemed
to have been interviewed once by the prosecutor in the absence of his lawyer.
However, they considered that the applicant’s defence rights had not been affected
by that episode, in so far as he had not made any incriminating statements.
Moreover, that remained an isolated episode, the applicant having been assisted
by his lawyer throughout the other more complex interviews.
They also pointed out that the second applicant had not been
informed about the investigations because he had absconded from
18 November 2003
until May
2004.
The Government rejected the allegations of
unfairness in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. In their view, the
court had given a detailed interpretation of the evidence and explained its conclusions
thoroughly. The decision had, in addition, been upheld by the High Court of
Cassation and Justice.
Moreover, unlike in the case of
Teixeira de Castro v.
Portugal
(
9 June 1998
,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998‑IV),
the courts in the case at hand had not based their
decision solely on the undercover agents’ testimonies. The applicants had been heard
by the first‑instance court (the Government referred,
a contrario
,
to
Ilișescu and Chiforec v. Romania
, no. 77364/01,
1 December
2005
) and had had the possibility of
cross-examining the undercover agent (they referred,
a contrario
, to
Dănilă
v. Romania
, no. 53897/00,
8 March
2007
).
In their view, it was enough for the first-instance court to
examine the evidence directly.
The Government pointed out that the Court of Appeal
had cleared up the doubts concerning the origin of the drug, as it had established
that the package had been handed over by the second applicant in exchange for
the money from Alex 1. Moreover, they averred that the applicants’ lawyers had not
requested further evidence before the Court of Appeal.
The Government also submitted that both courts
and prosecutors had examined the applicants’ allegations of police incitement and
dismissed them in thoroughly reasoned decisions.
Lastly, the Government argued that the first applicant
had not produced a valid prescription for the methadone. In any case the appeal
courts had answered his plea.
(b) The
applicants
The first applicant reiterated that he had been informed
from the very beginning of the covert operation and had been asked to help
“catch” the second applicant in
flagrante delicto
. In his view Alex 1 had
acted as an
agent provocateur
and used the two grammes of heroin to
frame the applicants. He pointed out that the courts had been unable to establish
what had happened to that heroin. Lastly, he argued that he had submitted a
valid authorisation to possess methadone at the material time.
The second applicant did not present his views within
the time‑limits set by the Court.
The Court’s assessment
The Court observes that in contesting the
fairness of the proceedings, the applicants put forward two arguments. Firstly,
they argued that they had only committed the offence because of the
intervention of
agents provocateurs
, the first applicant claiming that
he had been aware of the covert police operation and the second applicant that
he had only agreed to accompany the first applicant to the car in order to receive
his partner’s money. Secondly, they argued that in convicting them, the Court
of Appeal had not carried out a thorough examination of the evidence.
The Court reiterates its recent case-law on
Article 6 in which it elaborated on the concept of entrapment as distinct from
the use of legitimate undercover techniques and reaffirmed the domestic courts’
obligation to carry out a careful examination of the material in the file where
an accused invokes police incitement. In this context, the Court has also established
that its function under Article 6 § 1 is not to determine whether
certain items of evidence were obtained unlawfully, but rather to examine
whether such “unlawfulness” resulted in the infringement of another right
protected by the Convention; it has thus to review the quality of the domestic
courts’ assessment of the alleged entrapment and to ensure that they adequately
secured the accused’s rights of defence, in particular the right to adversarial
proceedings and to equality of arms (see
Ramanauskas
, cited
above, §§ 49-61;
Malininas v. Lithuania
, no. 10071/04, §§ 34-35,
1 July 2008; and
Bykov v. Russia
[GC], no. 4378/02, §§ 88-93,
10 March 2009).
To ascertain whether or not the undercover police
confined themselves to “investigating criminal activity in an essentially passive
manner” in the present case (see
Ramanauskas
, cited above, § 55), the
Court has regard to the following considerations. Nothing in the applicants’
past suggested a predisposition to trafficking in drugs. The fact alone that
one of them was a convicted drug user (see paragraph 21 above) cannot change
the Court’s conclusion. The Court notes that the prosecutor did not give
details, or refer to any objective evidence, concerning the applicants’ alleged
unlawful behaviour in his decision to start criminal proceedings. Moreover, no
heroin was found either in the first applicant’s possession or in the second
applicant’s home (see paragraphs 10-12 above).
The Court also notes that the parties gave
different interpretations of the events that had occurred on
18 November 2003
. According
to the Government, the first applicant had agreed to broker the deal between
the undercover agent, whose identity he did not know, and the second applicant,
and the drugs found in the agent’s car had resulted from that deal. However,
the first applicant, claiming police incitement, stated that he had been
informed of the covert operation, while the second applicant claimed that he
had been tricked into accepting the money; both applicants claimed that the two
grammes of heroin found by the police were the same as those released by the prosecutor’s
office for the covert operation.
In the light of this controversy, and
notwithstanding its subsidiary role in assessing the evidence, the Court shall
examine whether the applicants were able to raise effectively the issue of
incitement (see
Ramanauskas
, §§ 60-61, and
Malininas
, § 34, both
cited above).
The first-instance court concluded that the
evidence taken from the applicants, the undercover agent and witnesses
confirmed that there had been police incitement, and therefore acquitted the
applicants on that ground.
However, based on the same evidence, the appeal court
reversed the decision and convicted the applicants of trafficking in drugs. In
doing so, the Court of Appeal did not interview the persons who had appeared
before the prosecutor and the County Court. It decided to give precedence to
the statements obtained by the prosecutor and considered that those given before
the first-instance court had been false.
The Court reiterates that when a court of appeal
is called upon to examine the case as to the facts and the law and to make a
full assessment of the question of the applicant’s guilt or innocence, as it
was in the present case, it cannot, as a matter of fair trial, properly
determine the issues without a direct assessment of the evidence given in
person by the applicant where he or she claims not to have committed the act
alleged to constitute the criminal offence (see
Dănilă v.
Romania
, no. 53897/00, § 35, 8 March 2007
). The Court of Appeal
failed, in the present case, to take any evidence, let alone interview directly
the applicants on the merits of the accusations; the fact that the applicants
did not specifically request further evidence to be taken by the Court of Appeal,
as the Government pointed out, does not preclude that court from taking positive
measures to that effect (see
Dănilă
, cited above, § 41).
Likewise, the applicants’ last address to the court cannot be equated with
their right to be heard by the court during the trial (see
Constantinescu
v. Romania
, no. 28871/95, § 58, ECHR 2000‑VIII).
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that it cannot
hold in the abstract that evidence given by a witness in open court and on oath
should always be relied on in preference to other statements made by the same
witness in the course of criminal proceedings, not even when the two are in
conflict (see
Doorson v. the Netherlands
, 26 March 1996, § 78,
Reports
1996‑II
), the Court is not convinced by the summary reasoning
given by the Court of Appeal to justify the precedence given to the statements
obtained by the prosecutor. It notes, in particular, that the doubts harboured
by the Court of Appeal concerning the lack of honesty of the witnesses were not
supported by the findings of the investigators in the matter. The fact that the
applicants were heard by the first‑instance court and had the possibility
of cross-examining witnesses at that stage of the proceedings does not alter
the Court’s conviction on this point.
Lastly, unlike the Government, the Court is not
convinced by the answer the authorities, in particular the courts, gave to the
allegations of police incitement (see
Ramanauskas
, cited above, § 61).
Whether or not the first applicant knew of the police action and whether or not
the second applicant was tricked into accepting the money, the facts of the
case indicate that if it had not been for the agent’s express request to buy
drugs, none of the events of 18 November would have occurred.
The Court considers that the Court of Appeal
failed to properly examine the first applicant’s change of position,
considering without further explanation that he had refused, before the courts,
to admit to his involvement in the drug trafficking.
In conclusion, while being mindful of the importance
and the difficulties of the task of the investigating agents, the Court
considers, having regard to the foregoing, that the actions of the undercover
police officer and his collaborator had the effect of inciting the applicants
to commit the offence of which they were convicted, going beyond the mere
passive investigation of existing criminal activity, and that the domestic
courts did not investigate sufficiently the allegations of incitement. For
these reasons the applicants’ trial was deprived of the fairness required by
Article 6 of the Convention.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention on this account.
Furthermore, the Court considers that the
conclusion above makes examination of the remainder of the complaint redundant.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The Court has examined the remainder of the
complaints. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in
so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. In particular, the second
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that because of the
domestic courts’ erroneous recording of his pre-trial detention, he would have
to serve one additional year of detention. This error was, in fact, corrected
by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on
14 July
2006
(see paragraph 31 above). Lastly, invoking in substance Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the second applicant complained that he
could not comply with the confiscation order concerning the 1.48 g of heroin, since
the heroin found on 18 November had already been surrendered to the
investigators and he did not possess any other drugs. The Court notes, however,
that the confiscation order referred to the same drugs that were seized by the
police during the events on 18 November (see paragraph 30 above), and that no
other measures were taken against the applicants that would affect their
property rights for the purposes of Article 1.
It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been
a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party.”
A. Damage
The first applicant asked the Court to establish
a reasonable amount in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
The second applicant claimed, in his initial application to the
Court, 252,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 300,000 for
non-pecuniary damage; he did not answer the Court’s request, on
17 June 2008
, to
formulate his claims according to Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. After the
time-limits set for submission expired and the applicant was warned that his
application might be struck out, he informed the Court that he maintained his previous
claims.
The Government argued that the first applicant’s
claim for pecuniary damages should be dismissed as he had failed to adduce any
evidence as to the damage actually incurred.
In their view the second applicant’s claims should be dismissed
as he had failed to present them in line with Article 60 of the Rules of Court.
They referred to
Nițescu v. Romania
(no. 26763/03, § 48,
21 April 2009
). In
addition, they argued that the claims for the alleged pecuniary damage were
excessive and unjustified and that there was no causal link to any acts of the
authorities.
They also considered that the finding of a violation constituted
in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage alleged by
the applicants.
The Court does not discern any causal link
between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged by the first
applicant; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the first
applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Lastly, the Court notes that the second
applicant, who was represented by counsel, did not comply with the conditions
for submitting his claims, nor did he present a reasonable justification for
his failure to comply with the time-limits. It therefore rejects his claims
entirely.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicants made no claim under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.
Decides
to join the applications;
2.
Declares
the complaint concerning Article 6
(fairness of the criminal proceedings and presumption of innocence) admissible
and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;
3.
Holds
that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on the ground of police incitement and failure
of the domestic authorities to investigate the matter;
4.
Holds
that there is no need to examine the remainder
of the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention;
5.
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000
(ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary
damage, to be converted into the respondent State’s national currency, at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts
at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
6.
Dismisses
the remainder of the applicants’
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on
29 September 2009
, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley
Naismith Josep
Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President