ÎCCJ, decizie (scj.ro #86349)
ÎCCJ, decizie (scj.ro #86349) (Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție)
COUR EUROP
É
ENE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE
OF CUMPĂNĂ AND MAZĂRE v.
ROMANIA
(Application
no. 33348/96)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
17 December 2004
This judgment is final but may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Cumpănă and Mazăre v.
Romania
,
The European Court of Human Rights,
sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
Mr
L.
Wildhaber
,
President
,
Mr
C.L.
Rozakis
,
Mr
J.-P.
Costa
,
Mr
G.
Ress
,
Sir Nicolas
Bratza
,
Mr
I.
Cabral
Barreto
,
Mrs
V.
Strážnická,
Mr
C.
Bîrsan,
Mr
P.
Lorenzen,
Mr
J.
Casadevall,
Mr
B.
Zupanèiè,
Mr J.
Hedigan,
Mr
M.
Pellonpää,
Mr
A.B.
Baka,
Mr
R.
Maruste,
Mr
M.
Ugrekhelidze
,
Mr
K.
Hajiyev
,
judges
,
and Mr
P.J.
Mahoney
,
Registrar
,
Having deliberated in private on 1
September and
10 November 2004
,
Delivers the following judgment, which
was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 33348/96) against Romania lodged with the European Commission
of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by two Romanian nationals, Mr Constantin Cumpănă (“the first applicant”) and
Mr Radu Mazăre (“the second applicant”), on 23 August 1996.
The applicants were
represented by Mr M. Mocanu-Caraiani, a lawyer practising in Constanța. The
Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs R.
Rizoiu, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The applicants alleged, in
particular, that there had been unjustified interference with their right to
freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, on
account of their conviction following the publication on 12 April 1994 of an
article in a local newspaper.
The application was
transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the
Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).
The application was
allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of
Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article
27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
On 1 November 2001 the
Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was
assigned to the newly composed Second Section (Rule 52 § 1).
On 10 September 2002 the
application was declared partly admissible by a Chamber of that Section (“the
Chamber”), composed as follows: Mr J.‑P. Costa,
President
, Mr
L. Loucaides, Mr C. Bîrsan, Mr K. Jungwiert, Mr V. Butkevych, Mrs W. Thomassen,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
judges
, and Mrs S. Dollé,
Section Registrar
.
On 10 June 2003 the
Chamber delivered a judgment in which it held by five votes to two (Mr Costa
and Mrs Thomassen) that there had been no violation of Article 10 in respect of
the applicants.
On 2 September 2003 the
applicants requested under Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73 that the
case be referred to the Grand Chamber. The request was lodged and signed on
behalf of both applicants by the first applicant, Mr C. Cumpănă.
A panel of the Grand
Chamber accepted that request on 3 December 2003.
The composition of the
Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and
3 of the Convention and Rule 24.
On 15 March 2004 the
Government filed submissions on the applicants’ referral request.
The applicants replied to
those submissions in a letter of 17 August 2004. The second applicant appended
to the letter a declaration to the effect that he intended to join the first
applicant’s request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber.
A hearing took place in
public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 September 2004 (Rule 59 §
3).
There
appeared before the Court:
(a)
for
the Government
Mrs
R. Rizoiu
, Under-Secretary of
State,
Agent
,
Mr
R. Rotundu
,
Co-Agent
,
Ms
R. Pașoi
,
Ms
A. Prelipcean,
M
s
C. Roșianu,
Advisers
;
(b)
for the applicants
Mr
M. Mocanu-Caraiani,
Counsel
,
Mrs
D. Mocanu-Caraiani,
Adviser
.
The Court heard addresses by Mr
Mocanu-Caraiani, Mrs Rizoiu and Ms Roșianu, and also their replies to
questions put by its members.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CASE
The applicants, Mr
Constantin Cumpănă and Mr Radu Mazăre, were born in 1951 and 1968 respectively
and live in Constanța.
A. The circumstances of the
case
Background to the case
(a) The city authorities’ partnership
contract with the Vinalex company
In decision no. 33 of 30
June 1992 Constanța City Council, implementing Government decision no. 147 of
26 March 1992, introduced a fine for drivers of illegally parked vehicles and
entrusted the task of removing, towing away and impounding such vehicles to
S.C. CBN, a company based in Constanța.
By order no. 163 of 30
June 1992 the mayor of Constanța authorised a private company, Vinalex, to
perform the services of removing, towing away and impounding illegally parked
vehicles.
A partnership contract
was signed on 16 December 1992 by the city authorities and the company in
question, the signatories on behalf of the authorities being the deputy mayor
(hereinafter “D.M.”) and the council’s legal expert (“Mrs R.M.”). In a letter
of 1 April 1994 the mayor of Constanța requested Vinalex to stop carrying out
its activities under the contract and informed it that it was considering terminating
the contract.
(b) Content of the article in issue
On 12 April 1994 the
applicants, who are journalists by profession, published an article in the
local newspaper
Telegraf
, of which the second applicant was the editor,
with the headline “Former Deputy Mayor D.M. and serving judge R.M. responsible
for series of offences in Vinalex scam”. The names of the former deputy mayor
and of the city council’s former legal expert, Mrs R.M., who had subsequently
become a judge, were printed in full in the headline and in the article itself.
The article, which
appeared under the byline of both applicants, was worded as follows:
“In decision no. 33 of 30 June 1992 Constanța City
Council entrusted a commercial company, S.C. CBN SRL, with the task of impounding
illegally parked vehicles or trailers ... It was the duty of the city
authorities’ specialist departments to lay down the practical arrangements for
implementing the council’s decision. But things did not turn out that way. Six
months after decision no. 33 was adopted, the city authorities, knowingly
breaching the provisions of Law no. 69/1991, illegally concluded a partnership
contract ... with S.C. Vinalex SRL, a company having no connection with the one
initially chosen. It is worth noting, however, that the contract in question
was signed by the deputy mayor, D.M., in place of the mayor, ... and by a
certain M. instead of the legal expert M.T.
By what miracle did S.C. Vinalex enter into a
partnership with the city authorities when, in decision no. 33 of 30 June 1992,
the city council had authorised CBN SRL to provide a straightforward service?
What is striking is that there is no evidence that CBN agreed to give up the
task of towing away illegally parked vehicles! ... The crook D.M. (the former
deputy mayor, now a lawyer) granted Vinalex’s irresponsible employees the power
to decide when a vehicle is illegally parked – in other words, to treat
citizens and their property with contempt. What form did the fraud take?
Sections 89 and 29 of Law no. 69/91 provide that no partnership contract
with a commercial company may be signed without a prior decision by the local
council, adopted by a two-thirds majority of the total number of councillors.
Before a contract is signed, it must be referred to all the local council’s
specialist committees for their opinion ... The contract with Vinalex was
negotiated and signed illegally, as the signatories based it on the decision
[of 30 June 1992], which, as has already been shown, referred to a different
company without envisaging any other partnership.
Given that the city authorities had already signed
four other contracts before that one, the signatories cannot claim ignorance of
the law, but only an intentional breach of it! And because any intentional
breach of the law pursues an end in itself – generally that of securing
material advantages – it is clear that in this case the former deputy mayor, a
lawyer by profession, received backhanders from the partner company and bribed
his subordinates, including R.M., or forced them to break the law.
The Constanța Audit Court detected this blatant fraud,
which has generated considerable profits for the briber (S.C. Vinalex) ... The
offending company [S.C. Vinalex] has never shown that it had adequate means to
impound illegally parked vehicles. This explains why large numbers of privately
owned vehicles have been damaged and, as a result, thousands of complaints have
been made on the subject.
Furthermore, the alleged partnership contract was
valid for one year, until 16 December 1993. From that date [S.C. Vinalex]
no longer had any right to interfere with citizens’ private property! It has
nevertheless carried on towing vehicles away and illegally collecting money ...
It is incomprehensible how the police could have provided it with assistance
for the past four months.
Let us briefly consider the conduct of the council’s
former legal expert, R.M., who is now a judge. Either she was ignorant of
national legislation when she signed the partnership contract, in which case it
is hard to understand how she can subsequently have been appointed as a judge
(delivering justice on the basis of the same laws which she does not know), or
she accepted bribes and may continue to do so in future! It is no surprise that
the same judge should have been investigated by the Audit Court for a further
illegal act, also committed while she was at the city council (as we reported
at the time). Ironically, the court’s president did not take any action against
her on the ground that the sum received was not ... high enough.
Apparently becoming aware that the matter was likely
to be uncovered, the city authorities’ coordination department ... notified
S.C. Vinalex in writing of the possibility of the contract being terminated on
the following grounds: ... ‘You have not supplied any documents showing that
you have purchased the platform-type equipment necessary for carrying out the
activity properly’ (as stipulated in clause 3 of the contract ...). In the
same letter the city council informed S.C. Vinalex: ‘As you have not proved
that you have the appropriate equipment, we would assess your contribution to
the partnership at the level of your company’s capital, that is 110,000 lei.
Your share in the partnership’s net income will have to be recalculated in
relation to the parties’ contributions.’
Facts are facts, and the documents in our possession
‘speak’ for themselves of the illegal Vinalex scam.”
The article was
accompanied by a photograph of a police car on the scene as an illegally parked
vehicle was being towed away, photocopies of extracts from the partnership
contract and from Constanța City Council’s decision of 30 June 1992, and
certain passages of Law no. 69/91 concerning the responsibilities and powers of
mayors, prefects and city and county councils.
The article was also
accompanied by a cartoon showing a man and a woman arm in arm, carrying a bag
marked “Vinalex” which was full of banknotes. The two characters were depicted
as saying to each other:
“Hey, R. [diminutive form of Mrs R.M.’s first name],
you’ve done a good job there! When I was deputy mayor we made quite a bit,
enough to go to America ...”
“D. [diminutive form of the former deputy mayor’s
first name], if you become a lawyer, I’ll become a judge and we’ll have enough
to travel round the world ...”
(c) Findings of the Audit Court’s auditors
In June 1994 the
Financial Control Department of the County Audit Court examined a report
submitted on 26 May 1994 by several auditors who had conducted a review of
Constanța City Council’s budget for 1992 and had made the following findings:
(a) The city council’s
decision of 30 June 1992 to award S.C. CBN the contract for towing away
illegally parked vehicles had not been justified by any bid submitted in
writing by the company or by the company’s aims as set forth in its articles of
association.
(b) The city council had not
given its opinion on the partnership contract signed between the city
authorities and the Vinalex company, and no expert valuation of Vinalex’s
assets had been carried out or submitted to the council for approval, contrary
to the provisions of the Local Public Administration Act (Law no. 69/91).
(c) The distribution of the
proceeds among the parties as agreed in the contract – 70% to Vinalex and 30%
to the city council – had not corresponded to the partners’ respective
contributions on the date on which the contract had been signed – 76.4% by the
city council and 23.6% by Vinalex – resulting in a loss of income for the city
council.
The Financial Control Department
considered it necessary to urge the mayor of Constanța, as the official
responsible for authorising appropriations, to “ensure compliance with the law”
as regards the parties’ obligations under the contract and to be more efficient
when entering into such partnerships with private entities in future. A formal
decision to that effect was adopted on 8 June 1994 by the head of the
department.
The applicants produced
to the Court a report dated 17 March 1994 by the same Audit Court auditors,
which likewise referred to the irregularities described in paragraph 23 above
in the signing of the partnership contract between the city authorities and
Vinalex, and indicated that the contract should be terminated. The applicants
did not mention the existence of such a report during the criminal proceedings
instituted against them following the publication of the impugned newspaper
article.
The criminal proceedings
against the applicants
(a) Proceedings at first instance
On 14 April 1994, after
the publication of the article, Mrs R.M. instituted proceedings against the
applicants in the Constanța Court of First Instance for insult and defamation,
offences under Articles 205 and 206 respectively of the Criminal Code. She
complained, in particular, about the cartoon accompanying the article, which
had depicted her as a “woman in a miniskirt, on the arm of a man with a bag
full of money, and with certain intimate parts of her body emphasised as a sign
of derision”. She submitted that the article, the cartoon and the dialogue
between the characters had led readers to believe that she had had intimate
relations with D.M., and pointed out that she and the former deputy mayor were
both married.
At a hearing on 13 May
1994 the court adjourned the case as the applicants were not present and,
scheduling a further hearing for 27 May 1994, directed that they should be
brought before the court on that date.
On 27 May 1994 the second
applicant stated at the hearing that, as editor, he assumed full responsibility
for what had been published in the newspaper. He explained that cartoons were
frequently used in the press as a medium for criticism and that he had not
intended to damage the claimant’s reputation. In reply to a question from the
court he admitted having known that, by order of the mayor of Constanța,
Vinalex had been authorised to tow away illegally parked vehicles. He stated,
however, that he had not thought it necessary to publish that information.
Lastly, he stressed that he did not intend to reach a settlement with the
injured party and that he was prepared to publish an article in her favour
provided that she could prove that what he had published was untrue.
On 10 June 1994 the
applicants applied to have the case transferred to a court in another county.
They also requested an adjournment of the proceedings, arguing that because the
claimant was a judge it was impossible for them to find a member of the
Constanța Bar who would agree to represent them.
On an unspecified date
the Constanța Bar, in reply to a question from the court, attested that the
applicants had not met with a refusal on the part of all of its members and
that, in any event, the matter had not been referred to its executive.
On 15 June and 1 July
1994 the court adjourned the case as the applicants were not present.
In an interlocutory
decision of 21 July 1994 the Supreme Court of Justice ordered the referral of
the case to the Lehliu-Gară Court of First Instance.
On 15 November 1994 the
case was entered on that court’s list of cases for hearing. Public hearings
were held on 21 December 1994 and on 25 January, 27 February, 20 March, 17
April and 17 May 1995.
On 21 December 1994 and
25 January 1995 the applicants did not attend the hearings, although they had
been duly summoned. The court summoned them to appear at the hearings of 25
January and 27 February 1995. The applicants did not comply with the summonses.
At the hearings on 27
February and 20 March 1995, representatives of
Telegraf
applied for an
adjournment on behalf of the applicants, who were not present. The court
allowed the application.
On 20 March 1995 a member
of the Bucharest Bar, N.V., agreed to represent the applicants.
At the hearing on 17
April 1995 in the morning N.V. asked the court to consider the case after 11.30
a.m. The court granted his request. However, when it sat to examine the case at
12 noon and, subsequently, at 2.30 p.m. it noted that neither the applicants
nor their counsel were present in the courtroom. It accordingly adjourned the
case until 17 May 1995.
At the hearing on 17 May
1995 the court reserved judgment, after noting that neither the applicants –
despite their having been duly summoned – nor their counsel had appeared. In a
judgment delivered on the same day the court found the applicants guilty of
insult and defamation, offences under Articles 205 and 206 respectively of the
Criminal Code. It sentenced them to three months’ imprisonment for insult and
seven months’ imprisonment for defamation and ordered them both to serve the
heavier sentence, namely seven months’ immediate imprisonment. As well as this
main penalty, the court imposed the secondary penalty of disqualification from
exercising all the civil rights referred to in Article 64 of the Criminal Code
(see paragraph 58 below).
It also prohibited the applicants from
working as journalists for one year after serving their prison sentences, a
security measure provided for in Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see
paragraph 59 below).
Lastly, it ordered them to pay Mrs R.M.
25,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL) (equivalent to EUR 2,033 at the exchange rate
applicable at the material time) for non-pecuniary damage.
In stating its reasons
for the judgment the court observed, firstly:
“The court notes that the injured party has always
been present, both in the Constanța Court of First Instance and in the
Lehliu-Gară Court of First Instance, whereas the defendants have generally been
absent without justification, despite having been lawfully summoned. In support
of her prior complaint, the injured party, Mrs R.M., sought leave to produce
documentary evidence. [Mrs R.M.] submitted a copy of the 12 April 1994 edition
of the local newspaper
Telegraf
, containing the article referred to in
her complaint and the cartoon in which she was ridiculed.
The court notes that the defendants and the party
liable to pay damages, despite being lawfully summoned, have not attended any
hearings, and that only the injured party has been present.
The court notes that the defendants R. Mazăre and C.
Cumpănă were informed of the charges against them and of the hearing dates, and
that they were assisted by a lawyer of their choosing (who asked the court
first for an adjournment and subsequently for consideration of the case to be
postponed until the second sitting, after 11.30 a.m.).
The court observes that the defendant R. Mazăre gave
evidence to the Constanța Court of First Instance at a public hearing on 27 May
1994, and notes the following from his testimony: the defendant considered that
it was not compulsory to have studied at journalism college to work as a
journalist; he refused to reply when asked whether he had had access to any
other documents on which Constanța City Council’s decision no. 33 had been
based; he understood by ‘series of offences’ the fact of committing several
offences; he understood by a multiple breach of the criminal law the
‘infringement of several offences’; he considered that the injured party, in
signing the contract in her capacity as a legal expert at the city council, had
infringed a number of the provisions of Law no. 69/1991; he pointed out that he
could not give the precise legal classification of the offences committed by
the injured party, as that did not come within his sphere of competence; he
stated that he had said everything there had been to say about the injured
party in the newspaper article; he submitted that cartoons were used everywhere
and maintained that he had not (through the cartoon) damaged anybody’s
reputation (specifically, that of the injured party).
[The court] notes that the defendant R. Mazăre stated
that he assumed full responsibility for everything published in his newspaper, as
its editor; ... that he stated that he was aware of the constitutional
provisions on the right of journalists to impart information to the public;
that he had read the Government decision in its entirety and had not published
it for lack of space; that he also stated that he had read the full text of the
partnership contract entered into by the city authorities and signed by the
injured party, Mrs R.M., but that he did not know whether the Government
decision had referred to partnership contracts; ... that the defendant had been
aware that the Vinalex company had been authorised by order of the mayor of
Constanța to provide the service of towing away illegally parked vehicles, but
that he had not thought it necessary to publish that information in the newspaper;
and, lastly, that he stated: ‘In view of the seriousness of the offences
committed, I do not think that it was necessary to discuss the matter with the
injured party beforehand. Should any documents prove that my statements are
unfounded, I am prepared to publish an article in the injured party’s favour.’”
With regard to the
documentary evidence which the injured party intended to rely on in support of
her allegations, the court observed:
“Apart from the article published in
Telegraf
,
the injured party, Mrs R.M., produced Constanța City Council’s decision no.
33 – adopted in accordance with Government decision no. 147 of 26 March
1992 – in which it was decided to tow away illegally parked vehicles; order no.
163 of 30 June 1992 by the mayor of Constanța ... authorising the Vinalex
company to remove, tow away and impound illegally parked vehicles (‘The
conditions for the performance of these services shall be laid down in the
partnership contract to be drawn up’); Government decision no. 147 of 26 March
1992, in which mayors were empowered to order the removal, towing away and
impounding of illegally parked vehicles by duly authorised specialist
companies; and order no. 369 of 1 July 1994 by the mayor of Constanța, in which
Vinalex was authorised to provide such services.”
With regard more
particularly to the article and cartoon in issue, the court held:
“... the article, by the defendants R. Mazăre and C.
Cumpănă, was directed at the injured party, disparaging her honour, dignity and
public image and injuring her own self-esteem by means of the (written)
accusations conveyed through signs and symbols targeted specifically at her.
The court considers that these acts took place, that
they are punishable under the criminal law, and that they posed a danger to
society, not so much because of their practical effect (physical distortion of
outward reality) but above all because of the psycho-social consequences
resulting from the provision of misleading or incorrect information to the
public, giving rise to inaccurate judgments about facts and individuals,
establishing a false scale of values in view of the role and public impact of
the media, and causing psychological trauma to the injured party. In making its
assessment, the court has had regard to the particular status of the parties to
the proceedings: the injured party, Mrs R.M., being a lawyer and a
representative of the judiciary, and the defendants, Mr R. Mazăre and Mr C.
Cumpănă, being representatives of the media.
The court notes that the defendant R. Mazăre, while
realising the seriousness of the acts he had committed, irresponsibly stated
that he had been ‘aware of the fact that Vinalex had been authorised by order
of the mayor, but did not consider it necessary to publish that order (as well)’...
The court considers that publication of the article in
the newspaper cannot have been justified by a ‘legitimate interest’ in that it
was not based on actual facts and the provision of accurate information to the
public. It concludes that the defendants ... ‘forgot’ the content of Article 30
of the Constitution: ‘Freedom of expression shall not be prejudicial to a
person’s dignity, honour and private life or to the right to one’s own image’,
and of Article 31 § 4 of the Constitution: ‘Public and private media shall be
required to provide the public with accurate information.’
It follows from the written submissions filed by the
injured party ... that she always wanted the criminal proceedings to be
terminated by amicable agreement, provided that the defendants agreed to
retract the allegations made in the article.
The court notes that the injured party is a public
figure and that, following the publication of the article, her superiors and
the authority above them asked her for an explanation about the trial,
particularly in view of the fact that she was due to take the examination to
obtain permanent status.”
(b) Proceedings on appeal
On an unspecified date
the applicants appealed against the first-instance judgment of 17 May 1995.
At a hearing on 2
November 1995 the Călărași County Court reserved judgment, having noted that
the case was ready for decision and that the applicants had not appeared in
court, despite having been duly summoned, and had not stated any grounds for
their appeal.
In a judgment of 2
November 1995 the court, after examining all the aspects of the case against
the applicants, as required by Article 385
6
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP), upheld the first-instance judgment, finding it to have been
correct. The County Court’s judgment, sent to the archives on 23 November 1995,
was final and binding and no ordinary appeal lay against it.
(c) Proceedings following the
Procurator-General’s application to have the judgments quashed
On 10 April 1996 the
Procurator-General applied to the Supreme Court of Justice to have the
judgments of 17 May 1995 and 2 November 1995 quashed. He submitted the
following arguments.
(a) The courts’ legal
classification of the facts had been incorrect. Pointing out that in the
cartoon the applicants had simply highlighted their allegations of corruption
on the part of certain city-council officials, he accordingly submitted that
the facts in issue did not constitute the
actus reus
of insult as
defined in Article 205 of the Criminal Code.
(b) The amount which the
applicants had been ordered to pay in damages had been extremely high and had
not been objectively justified.
(c) Lastly, the requirements
of Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code, by which the courts could prohibit
persons who had committed unlawful acts from practising a particular profession
on account of their incompetence, lack of training or any other ground making
them unfit to practise the profession, were not satisfied in the applicants’
case, as there was no unequivocal proof that the applicants were incompetent to
continue working as journalists or that their doing so entailed a potential
danger.
In a final judgment of 9
July 1996 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the Procurator-General’s
application as being manifestly ill-founded, for the following reasons:
“It has been established from the evidence adduced in
the present case that on 12 April 1994 the accused, R. Mazăre and C.
Cumpănă, published in the Constanța newspaper
Telegraf
an article
entitled ‘Former Deputy Mayor D.M. and serving judge R.M. responsible for
series of offences in Vinalex scam’, in which it was asserted that in 1992,
while she was employed as a legal expert at Constanța City Council, the injured
party, Mrs R.M., had been involved in fraudulent activities on the part of a
commercial company, Vinalex.
The Supreme Court further notes that alongside the
above-mentioned article, the accused published a cartoon in which the injured
party was depicted in the company of a man carrying a bag full of money on his
back, and that this was likely to have an adverse effect on the injured party’s
honour, dignity and public image.
It follows that in publishing the article in
Telegraf
,
the accused attributed specific acts to the injured party which, had their
allegations been made out, would have rendered her criminally liable; the two
lower courts were therefore correct in finding the accused guilty of defamation
under Article 206 of the Criminal Code.
The fact that the accused published alongside the
above-mentioned article a cartoon in which the injured party was depicted in
the company of a man carrying a bag full of money, in such as way as to
disparage her honour and reputation, constitutes the offence of insult as
defined in Article 205 of the Criminal Code ...”
With regard to the amount
which the applicants had been ordered to pay in damages, the Supreme Court
held:
“... the requirement for the accused to pay 25 million
lei for non-pecuniary damage was justified, since it is beyond dispute that in
publishing the article on 12 April 1994 in a mass-circulation newspaper, the
accused seriously offended the dignity and honour of the injured party.”
The Supreme Court held,
lastly, in relation to the alleged unlawfulness of the temporary prohibition on
the applicants’ working as journalists:
“... since the application of security measures in
circumstances other than those provided for by law does not feature on the
exhaustive list of cases in which the law permits the Procurator-General to
apply to have a decision quashed, it cannot form a legal basis for quashing the
judgments in issue.”
The applicants’
circumstances after being convicted in the final and binding judgment of 2
November 1995
(a) Execution of the prison sentence and of
the secondary penalty of disqualification from exercising civil rights
The applicants did not
serve the prison sentence they had received in the judgment of 2 November 1995,
since immediately after the judgment had been delivered the Procurator-General
suspended its execution for eleven months by virtue of Article 412 CCP (see
paragraph 61
in fine
below).
In a letter of 30
September 1996 the Procurator-General at the Supreme Court of Justice informed
the applicants that he had extended the stay of execution until 27 November
1996.
On 22 November 1996 the
applicants were granted a presidential pardon dispensing them from having to
serve their prison sentence. By virtue of Article 71 CPP, the pardon also
waived their secondary penalty of disqualification from exercising civil rights
(see paragraph 58
in fine
below).
(b) Prohibition on working as journalists
(i) The first applicant
It appears from the first
applicant’s employment record (
cartea de muncă
), of which he submitted a
copy to the Court, that, following the Călărași County Court’s judgment of 2
November 1995:
(a) he continued to work for
Telegraf
as editor of the “Events” section until 1 February 1996, when he was
transferred for administrative reasons to the C. company, occupying the same
position and receiving the same salary as before;
(b) while working for C., he
was awarded a pay rise;
(c) he ceased to work for C.
on 14 April 1997 on account of staff cutbacks by his employer, a ground for
dismissal provided for in Article 130 (a) of the Labour Code as worded at the
material time; and
(d) he was not then gainfully
employed until 7 February 2000, when he was recruited on a permanent contract
by the A. company as deputy editor.
(ii) The second applicant
Following the final and
binding judgment of 2 November 1995 the second applicant continued to work as
editor of
Telegraf
, as indicated in a letter which he sent to the Court
on 19 January 2000.
Between 1 September 1997
and 30 November 1999, while he was a member of the Romanian Parliament, the sum
of ROL 25,000,000 was deducted from his parliamentary allowance and transferred
to Mrs R.M.’s bank account, pursuant to the Lehliu-Gară Court of First
Instance’s judgment of 2 November 1995 (see paragraph 37
in fine
above).
On an unspecified date
after that judgment he was elected mayor of Constanța, a position he still
holds.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Criminal Code
Offences against the
individual
At the material time the
relevant provisions were worded as follows:
Article 205 – Insult
“Anyone who disparages the reputation or honour of
another through words, gestures or any other means shall be liable to
imprisonment for between one month and two years or to a fine.”
Article 206 – Defamation
“Anyone who makes any statement or allegation in
public concerning a particular person which, if true, would render that person
liable to a criminal, administrative or disciplinary penalty or expose them to
public opprobrium shall be liable to imprisonment for between three months and
three years or to a fine.”
In Resolution no. 1123 of
24 April 1997 on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Romania, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe observed that Articles 205 and
206 of the Romanian Criminal Code were unacceptable and seriously imperilled
the exercise of fundamental freedoms, in particular the freedom of the press.
The Assembly therefore called on the Romanian authorities to amend those
provisions without delay.
Following a process of
legislative reform, the New Romanian Criminal Code Act (Law no. 301 of 28 June
2004) provides that the offence of defamation is punishable solely by a fine
(Article 225 of the New Criminal Code) and no longer classifies insult as a
criminal offence. These legislative amendments will come into force on 29 June
2005.
Penalties
The relevant provisions
are worded as follows:
Article 64 – Additional penalties
“Disqualification from exercising one or more of the
rights mentioned below may be imposed as an additional penalty:
(a) the right to vote and to be elected to
bodies of a public authority or to public elective office;
(b) the right to occupy a position
entailing the exercise of State authority;
(c) the right to perform a duty or practise
a profession or activity by means of which the convicted person carried out the
offence;
(d) parental rights;
(e) the right to act as a child’s guardian
or statutory representative.”
Article 71 – Secondary penalty
“The secondary penalty shall consist in
disqualification from exercising all the rights listed in Article 64.
A life sentence or any other prison sentence shall automatically
entail disqualification from exercising the rights referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the time at which the conviction becomes final until the end of
the term of imprisonment or the granting of a pardon waiving the execution of
the sentence ...”
Security measures
The relevant provision is
worded as follows:
Article 115 – Prohibition on performing a duty or
practising a profession
“Anyone who has committed an [unlawful] act through
incompetence, lack of training or for any other reasons rendering him or her
unfit to perform certain duties or to practise a certain profession or activity
may be prohibited from performing those duties or practising that profession or
activity. Such a measure may be revoked on request after one year if the
grounds on which it was imposed are no longer valid.”
Grounds for negating
criminal responsibility or the effects of a conviction
The relevant provisions
are worded as follows:
Article 120 – Effects of a pardon
“A pardon shall have the effect of waiving the
execution of a sentence. ... A pardon shall have no effect on security measures
or educational measures.”
Article 134 – Rehabilitation
“A person sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less
than one year shall be legally rehabilitated if he does not commit any further
offences for three years.”
B. The Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP)
The relevant provisions
are worded as follows:
Article 409
“The Procurator-General may, of his own motion or on
an application by the Minister of Justice, apply to the Supreme Court of
Justice for any final decision to be quashed.”
Article 410
“An application to have a final conviction ... quashed
may be made:
I. ...
where the penalties imposed fell outside
the limits prescribed by law; ...
where the offence was incorrectly
classified in law...”
Article 412
“Before applying to have a decision quashed, the
Procurator-General may order a stay of its execution.”
THE LAW
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: SCOPE
OF THE GRAND CHAMBER’S JURISDICTION
In their observations in
reply to the applicants’ request for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber,
the Government submitted that the first applicant had made the request without
the second applicant’s explicit approval. However, the second applicant had not
been represented by the first applicant on the date on which the latter had
sent the request to the Court.
The Government submitted
that the scope of the Grand Chamber’s jurisdiction was limited to the first
applicant’s allegation of an infringement of his freedom of expression. They
accordingly requested the Grand Chamber not to examine the second applicant’s
complaints under Article 10 of the Convention.
The applicants objected
to that request and asked the Court to examine the case as a whole on the
grounds that their referral request had been lodged on behalf of both of them
and that the Convention did not explicitly state the potential consequences of
the fact that one of them had not signed the document.
In view of this dispute
between the parties, the Court must determine the scope of the case brought
before it following the applicants’ request for referral to the Grand Chamber
under Article 43 of the Convention, which provides:
“1. Within a period of three months from
the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in
exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.
A panel of five judges of the Grand
Chamber shall accept the request if the case raises a serious question
affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.
If the panel accepts the request, the
Grand Chamber shall decide the case by means of a judgment.”
According to the Court’s
settled case-law, the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber necessarily embraces
all aspects of the application previously examined by the Chamber in its
judgment, there being no basis for a merely partial referral of the case (see
K.
and T. v. Finland
[GC], no. 25702/94, §§ 140-141, ECHR 2001-VII, and
Perna
v. Italy
[GC], no. 48898/99, §§ 23-24, ECHR 2003-V). The “case”
referred to the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared
admissible (see,
mutatis mutandis,
Ireland v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 63, § 157, and
Azinas v.
Cyprus
[GC], no. 56679/00, § 32, ECHR 2004-III), with the parties to
the proceedings before the Chamber concerned, including their status on the
date on which the application was declared admissible.
That approach is,
moreover, in keeping with the spirit and the letter of Article 37 § 1
in
fine
of the Convention, by which the Court is entitled to continue the
examination of an application if respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention and the Protocols so requires, including where the circumstances
lead to the conclusion that the applicant does not intend to pursue his
application, an eventuality expressly provided for in Article 37
(c) which may be deemed akin to the second applicant’s not having
signed the referral request in the instant case (see,
mutatis mutandis
,
Karner
v. Austria
, no. 40016/98, § 28, ECHR 2003-IX).
Such a conclusion is all
the more appropriate in the present case as Mr Mazăre, in his declaration of 17
August 2004, expressly joined the referral request signed on behalf of both
applicants by the first applicant (see paragraphs 9 and 13 above), thereby
indicating, albeit retrospectively, his intention to pursue the complaint under
Article 10 of the Convention as declared admissible by the Chamber and to
submit it to the Grand Chamber for examination.
Accordingly, the scope of
the case now before the Grand Chamber is not limited in the manner claimed by
the Government.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicants submitted
that their conviction following the publication on 12 April 1994 of an article
in a local newspaper amounted to unjustified interference with their right to
freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, the
relevant parts of which provide:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ...
The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, ... or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.”
A. Submissions of those
appearing before the Court
The applicants
The applicants submitted
that the interference with their right to freedom of expression as a result of
their conviction by the national courts had not met a “pressing social need”
capable of justifying it under the second paragraph of Article 10 of the
Convention. They maintained, firstly, that by publishing the impugned article
in a local newspaper they had intended to draw public attention to the public
and political issues relating to the irregularities committed, in their
opinion, by the city authorities in the signing of a public partnership
contract with a private company.
Pointing out that they
had not made any reference in the article to the private life of the injured
party, Mrs R.M., and that this attested to their good faith, the applicants
argued that the cartoon which had resulted in their being accused of
interfering with the private life of the city council’s former legal expert
constituted a purely humorous form of satire and that in such circumstances the
exaggeration of certain characteristics of people and situations should be
tolerated. In their submission, only Mrs R.M.’s vivid imagination could have
led her to believe that the cartoon in question was insinuating that she had
had intimate relations with the former deputy mayor, and the Government should
not have concurred in this malicious interpretation.
They asserted that the national courts
had not found anything in the cartoon to suggest that the persons depicted in
it had been having an extramarital affair. They added that if they had been
aware of any such intimate relations between the two city-council officials,
they would have had no hesitation in giving a detailed, explicit and direct
description of them in the article.
They further submitted
that they should be regarded as having adequately checked the information they
had imparted to the public, seeing that they had based it on a report – whose
credibility had not been contested – adopted on 17 March 1994 by the Audit
Court, the only public institution authorised to review the management of
public finances. They stated that they had also had sources within the city
council and the Audit Court, whose identities they could not have disclosed
without putting them at risk.
The applicants pointed
out that the fact that they had not proved the truth of their allegations in
the national courts had resulted from objective considerations relating to the
principle of protection of sources, and from the attitude of the national
courts, which had not actively sought to establish that their allegations were
true. They submitted that “journalistic truth” pursued the aim of informing the
public speedily about matters of general interest and was accordingly different
from “judicial truth”, which the national courts established with a view to
determining the responsibility of those who acted illegally. The press could
not therefore be required to establish the facts with the same precision as was
required of the investigating authorities.
The applicants submitted
that the allegations that had resulted in their conviction, concerning the
unlawfulness of the public contract signed by the city authorities, had been
confirmed by the Audit Court’s report. They justified the fact that they had brought
them to the public’s attention two years after the contract had been signed by
pointing out that they had not had access to the report in question until that
date. They also emphasised that the article in issue had been directed at Mrs
R.M. in her capacity as a city-council official at the time of the events
described in it and not in any way in her capacity as a judge on the date on
which it had been published.
Lastly, they argued that
the fact that they had not served their prison sentence did not absolve the
Government of responsibility in relation to the interference with their freedom
of expression, and submitted that the sanctions imposed on them had been
excessive and had been tantamount to subjecting the free discussion of matters
of public interest to a form of individual and general censorship.
The Government
The Government submitted
that the applicants’ conviction had been necessary in a democratic society,
seeing that the publication of the article in issue had amounted to a manifest
breach of the ethics of journalism. Contending that the applicants had not
imparted reliable and accurate information to the public and had not acted in
good faith in asserting that Mrs R.M. was corrupt, they observed that the
applicants had not maintained in the national courts that they had checked
their information, having merely stated that they had taken into account
certain decisions by the city council and the mayor and an order by the
Government; however, there was nothing in those documents to justify the
serious accusations of corruption levelled at Mrs R.M.
The Government further
pointed out that in the national courts the applicants had never referred to
any other documents or information as a source for their article, despite having
been aware that there had been another decision by the city authorities
authorising Vinalex to perform the public service to which the partnership
contract related. Relying in particular on the evidence given by the second
applicant in the Constanța Court of First Instance, the Government asserted
that the applicants had not considered it necessary or relevant to publish that
document, even though it actually contradicted the message conveyed by the
article in issue. They further drew attention to what they regarded as
unequivocal references to Mrs R.M.’s private life – such as the use of
diminutives in the text accompanying the cartoon – which in their submission
were wholly inappropriate contributions to a debate on the matter of general
interest being brought to the public’s attention.
The Government went on to
argue, firstly, that the applicants had not established the truth of their
specific allegations of corruption and complicity on Mrs R.M.’s part in the
signing of illegal contracts and, secondly, that they had failed to provide the
national courts with even the slightest factual basis for their value judgments
as to the morality and competence of the city council’s former legal expert.
They noted in that connection that the courts had found the applicants guilty
of insult and defamation after establishing that they had acted in bad faith.
With regard more
particularly to the Audit Court report, the Government submitted that it could
not have formed a basis for the applicants’ allegations, seeing that it had not
been issued until 26 May 1994, more than one month after the publication of the
article. Furthermore, in the national courts the applicants had not mentioned
either the existence of such a report or the fact that reviews by the Audit
Court were in progress, thereby depriving the courts of the possibility of
requesting the relevant official documents from the supervisory bodies in
question.
The Government further
maintained that the applicants’ conviction had met a pressing social need,
namely the protection of Mrs R.M.’s private life and reputation and,
implicitly, the image of the judiciary, since the injured party’s status as a
serving judge had repeatedly been emphasised in the article in issue. They
considered that the applicants’ allegations, far from concerning a debate on a
matter of general interest, had in fact consisted of pers